

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 030246
ORIGIN EA-02

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-02 /005 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:EA/PRCM:RRHART

APPROVED BY:EA/PRCM:JSROY

EUR/SOV - LWILLEMS

-----101038Z 122329 /10

R 100436Z FEB 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO RUMJPG/USLO PEKING 0000

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 030246

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM FROM MOSCOW DATED FEBRUARY 2,
1977 SENT SECSTATE WASHDC INFO LENINGRAD IS REPEATED TO YOU:
QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 1543

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: U.S. SOVIET POLICY UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION:

II. THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

1. SUMMARY. WE CAN COUNT ON A LARGE MEASURE OF CONTINUITY
IN SOVIET PURSUIT OF "RELAXATION OF TENSIONS" HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAV
E

A LIMITED AND HIGHLY SELF-SERVING DEFINITION OF THE TERM (BREZHNEV'S
GLOSS OF JAN 18 AT TULA NOTWITHSTANDING), -- I.E. CO-EQUAL
STATUS WITH U.S. BUT SCOPE FOR HEAVY-HANDED, OPPORTUNISTIC,
AND EVEN IRRESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR THE U.S. HAS NO
INTEREST IN ACCEPTING THIS DEFINITION, AND EVERY INTEREST IN
MOVING THE USSR FURTHER ALONG THE PATH TO INTERNATIONAL MATURITY
BY CHALLENGING THE SOVIET DEFINITION WITH OUR OWN DEFINITION OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 030246

COMPREHENSIVE DETENTE. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD SIGNAL OUR
WILLINGNESS TO EXPAND THE AGENDA AND TO AFFORD THE SOVIETS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE WITH US IN NEW AREAS WHERE OUR INTERESTS
OVERLAP, BUT ONLY ON A CONSTRUCTIVE BASIS.

2. THE CORE ITEMS OF THE TRADITIONAL POST-WAR AGENDA -- ARMS
CONTROL, EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE-

FUL TRADE -- ALREADY ILLUSTRATE THE POSSIBILITIES CURRENTLY OPEN TO US. EVEN MORE THAN WE, THE SOVIETS UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD LIKE TO AVOID THE GUNS-OR-BUTTER DILEMMA THAT A MASSIVE NEW SURGE IN STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION WOULD ENTAIL, AND THE EUROPEAN AGENDA FOR 1977 WILL PROVIDE A SERIES OF TESTS OF THEIR INTEREST IN STABLE RELATIONS. BUT AS THE ADMINISTRATION EXAMINES THE AGENDA OF THE FUTURE IT SEEMS TO US THERE IS CONSIDERABLE SCOPE FOR PROMOTING NEW SOVIET HABITS OF RESPONSIBILITY ON OTHER ISSUES. THESE INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF INTERDEPENDENCE, NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD, WHERE THE SOVIETS, FRUSTRATED BY INSUFFICIENT ECONOMIC CLOUT AND AN INCREASINGLY IRRELEVANT IDEOLOGY, HAVE BECOME -- ALONG WITH OURSELVES -- MAJOR ARMS MERCHANTS. WHILE THE SOVIETS WOULD BE WARY OF THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MORE CONSTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR WE OFFER THEM, WE BELIEVE THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SHOULD PROBE THEIR ATTITUDES. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WORLD OCEAN SEEM PRIME CANDIDATES FOR EARLY APPLICATION OF SUCH AN APPROACH. (WE WILL PRESENT OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON TRADE AND COMMERCIAL POLICY IN A SEPERATE MESSAGE.)

3. THIS STRATEGY, WE BELIEVE, CAN BEST BE FRAMED IN TERMS OF A U.S. SOVIET POLICY WHICH GIVES FIRST PRIORITY TO OUR RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS ON THE SOVIET PERIPHERY WITH WHOM WE SHARE VALUES AND WHICH ALSO CHALLENGES THE USSR IN THIRD WORLD, NORTH-SOUTH AND OCEANIC AREAS WITH NEITHER GENERAL HOSTILITY NOR OVER-OPTIMISM, BUT COOLNESS OR RECEPTIVITY DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE AND ON SOVIET PERFORMANCE. WE SHOULD RESTRAIN THE NATURAL EMPATHY TO MANIPULATE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO POWERS WHOSE VALUES WE DO NOT SHARE : MOSCOW AND PEKING. WE SHOULD MAKE OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR OWN PRINCIPLES EXPLICIT IN THE CONDUCT OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 030246

BILATERAL DIPLOMACY WITH THE SOVIETS, AND DO SO PUBLICLY WHERE WE CAN. AS A COROLLARY, WE SHOULD INSIST ON IMMEDIATE AND STRICT RECIPROCITY AT EVERY STEP. THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS IN MARCH AND THE BELGRADE CSCE REVIEW MEETING OPENING JUNE 15 WILL PROVIDE EARLY TESTS OF OUR CAPACITY TO DEAL CREATIVELY WITH THE MAJOR ELEMENTS--

ARMS CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIORITY TO RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SUPER POWER RELATIONSHIP -- INVOLVED IN A STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE CHALLENGE. OVER A LONGER TIME FRAME, THIS STRATEGY WILL REQUIRE UNCOMMON PATIENCE, PROBITY AND SKILL. TO MANAGE IT WE WOULD NEED MORE CONTACT AND INFORMATION AS WELL AS MORE FREQUENT AND DETAILED CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS AT VARIOUS LEVELS -- IN EFFECT, A CONTINUING IN-DEPTH DIALOGUE ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES . END SUMMARY.

4. EXPANDING THE AGENDA. THE UNITED STATES CAN COUNT ON A LARGE MEASURE OF CONTINUITY IN THE SOVIET APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND TO RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THE HABITS OF MORE THAN A DECADE OF GERONTOCRATIC STEWARDSHIP IN MOSCOW MAKE IT

UNLIKELY THAT THIS AGED LEADERSHIP WILL MORE FAR IN ANY DIRECTION OFF THE COURSE TOWARD "RELAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION" IT HAS MRKED OUT FOR ITSELF. BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE A LIMITED AND SELF-SERVING DEFINITION OF WHAT THE PROCESS OF "RELAXING TENSION" MEANS. AS RECENTLY ARTICULATED IN BERZHNEV'S JAN 18 TULA SQEECH, FOR THEM IT MEANS NEGOTIATED PROGRESS ON THE MAJOR EAST-WEST SECURITY ISSUES: MANAGEMENT AND POSSIBLY REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION, MANAGEMENT OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE, AND MORE INTERACTION ACROSS THE EAST-WEST DIVIDE IN EUROPE. IT DOES NOT MEAN, IN THEIR MINDS, THE END OF IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE ON OTHER GROUNDS, THE CESSATION OF SOVIET SUPPORT FOR "LIBERATION" AND OTHER "REVOLUTIONARY" CAUSES. IT SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDES FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT -- INCLUDING PROPAGANDA-- IN SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES OR ANY OTHER "INTERNAL AFFAIRS." THE SOVIET APPROACH, WHILE GENERALLY PREDICTABLE, LEAVES PLENTY OF ROOM FOR WHAT WE CONSIDER IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR, SINCE IT ALSO JUSTIFIES OPPORTUNISTIC EXPLOITATION OF ANY WESTERN VALNERABILITIES WHICH
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 030246

EMERGE IN THE INTERACTION PROCESS.

5. THE U.S. SHOULD ALSO MAKE CONTINUITY A CENTRAL FEATURE OF ITS APPROACH TO THE VITAL U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE U.S. HAS NEITHER THE OBLIGATION TO ACCEPT NOR ANY INTEREST IN ACCEPTING THE LIMITED SOVIET DEFINITION OF "RELAZATION OF TENSION," BUT EVERY INTEREST INCHALLENGING THE USSR TO ACT AS A CONSISTENTLY RESPONSIBLE STATE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. INTERMITTENTLY THROUGHOUT ITS HISTORY, AND INCREASINGLY SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEMONSTRATED THE CAPACITY TO ACT AS A STATE, RATHER THAN AS A MAVERICK FACTION IN A GLOBAL CIVIL WAR. BUT THE TEMPTATIONTO OPPORTUNISM IS INGRAINED IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, BY HABIT AND IDEOLOGY. SINCE THE WAR, THE UNITED STATES HS BEEN THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL AGENT CHECKING SOVIET OPPORTUNISM, AND MOVING THE USSR TOWARD MORE PREDICTABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR. FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE USSR'S SLOW, UNEVEN EVOLUTION TOWARD INTERNATIONAL MATURITY SHOULD REMAIN A MAJOR AMERICAN POLICY GOAL.

6. THE KEY TO FURTHER PROGRESS AT THIS JUNCTURE, IT SEEMS TO US, LIES IN A STEADY AND PAINSTAKING EFFORT TO EXPAND THE SOVIET WORKING DEFINITION OF WHAT "RELAXING TENSION" MEANS BY MAKING THE COSTS OF IRRESPONSIBILITY CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS AT EVERY STEP, BUT ALSO BY OFFERING THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE A LARGER CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ISSUES BEYOND THOSE INVOLVING WEAPONS AND SECURITY.

7. THE TRADITIONAL CORE: ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPE.
THE CORE ITEM OF THE TRADITIONAL AGENDA -- ARMS CONTROL --PROVIDES THE BEST ILLUSTRATION OF THIS APPROACH IN ACTION. THE BILATER AND MULTILATERAL EFFORT TO REGULARIZE, CONTROL AND IF POSSIBLE

REDUCE ARMAMENTS COMPETITION HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR ALMOST TWO DECADES UNDER FIVE U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS. IT SHOULD BE VIGOROUSLY PROSECUTED: IT IS IN OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, AND THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE IT AS CENTRAL TO THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST. IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO RECOGNIZE THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SOVIET
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 030246

POSITION. ALTHOUGH THEY CLAIM ROUGH PRITY AND ARE PLEASED TO SEE US ACCEPT THE CLAIM (THEREBY ENHANCING THEIR EFFORTS TO BE SEEN AS OUR CO-EQUALS, TO STRENGTHEN THEIR GRIP OVER EAST EUROPE AND TO UNDERMINE THE ALLIANCE), THEY FEEL THEY ARE BEHIND, THOUGH NO LONGER DANGEROUSLY SO. WHAT WORRIES THEM, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, IS THE PROSPECT OF A NEW SPIRAL IN ARMS COMPETITION, IN WHICH U.S. TECHNOLOGICAL SUPREMACY GIVES US KEY ADVANTAGES.

8. A MASSIVE NEW ROUND IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION WOULD EXACERBATE THE GUNS-OR-BUTTER DILAMMA WITH WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS STRUGGLED FOR DECADES. WHILE OUR OWN RESOURCE ALLOCATION DIFFICULTIES HAVE INCREAED, THE PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS I MUCH MORE SEVERE, SINCE THEIR ECONOMIC SYSTEM LACKS THE STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY OF OURS. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REALISTIC PROSPECT THAT WE COULD EVER "SPEND THE SOVIETS INTO THE GROUND" EVEN IF WE WANTED TO, THE SPECTER OF HAVING TO DRAIN ADDITIONALFUNDS FROM MAJOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES AND EVEN MORE FROM THE CONSUMER SECTOR IS HIGHLY UNWELCOME TO THEM.

9. THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY WILLING TO PAY SOMETHING -- IN ARMS CONTROL AND OUTSIDE, IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE -- IN ORDER TO COPE WITH THIS GUNS-OR BUTTER DILEMMA. IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD, IN OTHER WORDS, THE U.S. CAN BOTH POSE THE PROBLEM AND OFFER THE REMEDY. IF THE U.S. CHOOSES TO PRESS ITS TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES IN THE STRATEGIC ARMS COMPETITION, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT MORE DIFFICUTL POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW AD MORE SOVIET OPPORTUNISM ABROAD. BUT IF WE CAN ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF LIMITING THE COMPETITION, WE MAY BE IN A POSITION TO EXPECT MORE RESPONSIBLE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

10. THE FIRST TEST OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN 1977 COULD COME IN EUROPE. THE COMING YEAR WILL PROVIDE A SERIES OF FRESH OPPORTUNITIES TO JUDGE SOVIET INTEREST IN STABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IN THIS KEY AREA. WHILE FORMALLY A BILATERAL NEGOTIATION, SALT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 030246

DEALS WITH ISSUES OF VITAL IMPORT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND

ALLIANCE COHESION. MBFR NEGOTIATIONS RESUME SHORTLY. BREZHNEV'S VISITS TO BONN AND PARIS ARE LAID ON, IF NOT ACTUALLY SCHEDULED. THE BELGRADE STATE OF CSCE OPENS JUNE 15. AND, ON BERLIN --WHERE MANY OF OUR PROBLEMS STEM FROM AMBIGUITIES AND DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT--, THE 1976 SOVIET CONCERN OVER THE EFFECTS OF EC INTERGRATION ON THE CITY'S STATUS HAVE BEEN MATCHED, AT THE BEGINNING OF 1977, BY WESTERN CONCERNS OVER GDR MOVES. MANY OF THE ISSUES TOUCH IN AN IMMEDIATE WAY ON WEST GERMANY AND ITS RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. BEYOND THESE QUESTIONS, THE SHADOW AGENDA IS LONG: WESTERN EUROPE FACES CONTINUING ECONOMIC CRISIS AND LEFTIST ADVANCES; EASTERN EUROPE FACES INSTABILITY -- IN YUGOSLAVIA, POLAND AND PERHAPS CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR-- POTENTIALLY MORE SERIOUS THAN ANYTHING EAST AND WEST HAVE DEALT WITH SINCE 1968.

11. THE AGENDA OF THE FUTURE: INTERDEPENDENCY AND NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES. BEYOND THE MAIN ITEMS OF THE TRADITIONAL AGENDA, HOWEVER, THE AGENDA OF THE FUTURE PROVIDES US WITH THE GREATEST SCOPE FOR PROMOTING THE HABITS OF RESPONSIBILITY WE WANT THE USSR TO ADOPT. THE ISSUES OF GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY, IT SEEMS TO US, CONSTITUTE THE GREATEST CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIETS FOR THIS PURPOSE, SINCE MOSCOW IS BOTH ENGAGED AND VULNERABLE. THE SOVIET RECORD ON THESE ISSUES IS UNEVEN. IN ENERGY, THE SOVIETS ARE STILL SUBSTANTIAL NET EXPORTERS AND HAVE GIVEN SOME THEORETICAL ENCOURAGEMENT TO PEC. HOWEVER, THEY ARE ALREADY FACING HARD PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE COMPETING CLAIMS OF RISING DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION, THE NEEDS OF THEIR ALLIES AND THE WISH TO EARN CONVERTIBLE CURRENCY. ON WORLD FOOD SUPPLIES, THE SOVIETS ARE CLEARLY VULNERABLE, BUT LOATH TO ADMIT IT. THEY WOULD STILL PREFER TO MEET THEIR PERIODIC EXTENSIVE NEEDS THROUGH FORAYS INTO THE WORLD MARKET, BUT WERE FORCED LAST YEAR FOR THE FIRST TIME INTO A LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S., IN RECOGNITION OF THEIR INABILITY TO PROCURE SUFFICIENT GRAIN OUTSIDE THE U.S. LARGER PARTICIPATION IN WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REMAINS A TEMPTATION FOR THEM, BUT LITTLE MORE. ON THE WORLD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 030246

OCEAN, THEY HAVE BEEN SERIOUS AND CONSISTENT IN LAW-OF-THE-SEA NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IN OTHER AREAS -- FISHERIES AND THE PRESERVATION OF LIVING RESOURCES -- THEY HAVE BEEN SOMEWHAT ERRATIC. ON ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS, THEY HAVE TAKEN SOME STEPS AT HOME, AND HAVE ENGAGED IN SOME USEFUL EXCHANGES ABROAD, BUT ARE CAUTIOUS IN COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO IDENTIFYING AND RESOLVING GLOBAL ISSUES. IN SUM, ON INTERDEPENDENCE ISSUES, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN ULTRA-CAUTIOUS, SEEKING AT LOW COST TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO FULL-SCALE PARTICIPATION.

12. THE SAME IS TRUE OF SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, AND TOWARD THE THIRD WORLD GENERALLY. MOSCOW CONTINUES TO DENY THAT NORTH-SOUTH IS A PROPER DISTINCTION, AND TO ARGUE

VEHEMENTLY THAT THE TRUE DIVISION OF THE WORLD IS BETWEEN CAPITALIST AND "SOCIALIST" STATES, WITH THE LATTER "NATURALLY" ON THE SIDE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BELIEVES THAT THE THIRD WORLD IS SLOWLY BUT UNEVENLY MOVING TOWARD "SOCIALISM" AND THAT MOSCOW'S OBLIGATION IS TO ACCELERATE THE PROCESS WHEREEVER POSSIBLE. PARTLY IN SUPPORT OF THIS OBJECTIVE, SOVIET AID IS CONCENTRATED WHERE THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL RETURNS APPEAR GREATEST. THESE CONSIDERATIONS, PLUS UNWILLINGNESS TO INJECT INDESCRIMINATELY MASSIVE ECONOMIC AID INTO THE THIRD WORLD, HELPS EXPLAIN THE GENERAL SOVIET DISINCLINATION TO RENDER CONSTRUCTIVE AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHICH IN THEIR VIEW SEEM SLOW TO EMBRACE THE "SOCIALIST PATH," OR TO HELP FIND SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIPS.

13. AT THE SAME TIME, APARTE FROM THEIR RECENT SETBACK IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE SOVIETS HAVE MANAGED THEIR LIMITED ASSETS EFFECTIVELY, FROM THE NARROW VIEWPOINT OF EXPLICIT NATIONAL INTEREST. AS A HUGE MILITARY STATE WITH SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC POWER, THE USSR ALREADY HAS GREAT INFLUENCE ON ITS IMMEDIATE THIRD WORLD NEIGHBORS. BEYOND THIS FIRST TIER THE USSR HAS PRETENSIONS TO A GLOBAL ROLE. BUT LACKING ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVES, THE USSR FEELS OBLIGED TO PROMOTE ITS INFLUENCE THROUGH MOST OF THE THIRD WORLD THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS (TRANSFER OF MILITARY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 08 STATE 030246

HARDWARE, TRAINING, THE BLUE-WATER NAVY). SINCE MAJOR SOVIET SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS ARE NOT ENGAGED, AS THEY ARE VIS-A-VIS EUROPE, CHINA AND THE U.S., IT IS IN THE THIRD WORLD THAT THE SOVIETS CAN GIVE FREEST VENT TO THE NEED TO PRESERVE THEIR REVOLUTIONARY CREDENTIALS THROUGH MODEST ASSISTANCE AND THROUGH RHETORIC. AND, IN THIS POST-COLONIAL PERIOD, WHEN MANY NEW STATES ARE STILL LED BY THOSE WHO GENERATED SUCCESSFUL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIET LINE STILL HAS OBVIOUS APPEAL, PARTICULARLY IN SITUATIONS WHERE THE U.S. CAN BE PORTRAYED AS THE MAIN OPPONENT BY LOCAL LEADERSHIPS.

14. NEVERTHELESS, WEAPONRY AND IDEOLOGY ARE DECLINING ASSETS WHERE NEWLY SUCCESSFUL REGIMES FACE THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING INFRASTRUCTURES, DEMONSTRATING ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT, AND COPING WITH FOOD/POPULATION PRESSURES. THE ISSUES ARE BECOMING MORE COMPLEX AND THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD LIMITED SUCCESS IN MAINTAINING INFLUENCE. WHERE THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED OVER THE LONGER TERM (AS IN INDIA AND IRAQ), SUCCESS HAS BEEN PARTLY THE RESULT OF HAVING BUILT NORMAL STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS, AND PARTLY OF PROVIDING SUBSTANTIAL NON-MILITARY AID.

15. QUICKENING THE PACE OF PROGRESS ON INTERDEPENDENCE AND NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES LEAVES THE USSR AT LEAST A STEP BEHIND IN ALMOST EVERY CASE. EVERY SUCCESSFUL STEP BY THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES TOWARD THE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NORTH-SOUTH AND

GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IS AN OBJECT LESSON TO THE THIRD WORLD AND TO MOSCOW, IN SOVIET INADEQUACY AND LIMITED RELEVANCE. WE SHOULD WASTE NO OPPORTUNITY TO DRIVE THE LESSON HOME, IN THE UN, IN OUR APPROACH TO THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, AND IN OUR EFFORTS TO FACILITATE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS IN LOCAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS, AS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

16. IN HIGHLIGHTING THE GAP BETWEEN SOVIET RHETORIC AND SOVIET PERFORMANCE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD KEEP OUR OWN PRINCIPLES IN MIND, AND WE SHOULD RECALL THAT OUR GOAL IS TO PROMOTE THE USSR'S SLOW EVOLUTION TOWARD RESPONSIBILITY COMMENSURATE WITH ITS STRENGTH
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 030246

IN THE FUTURE AS WELL AS THE PRESENT. GREATER SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL TRANSACTIONS IS NOT INVARIABLY IN OUR INTEREST, AND WE SHOULD BE SELEVTIVE IN ENCOURAGING IT. WHERE THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION IS NEGLIGIBLE IN AREAS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE THIRD WORLD, WE SHOULD BY ALL MEANS POINT THIS OUT. BUT WE NEED TO REMEMBER THAT THE HABIT OF RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE SECURED SO LONG AS SOVIET ENGAGEMENT IS LIMITED TO PEDDLING MILITARY HARDWARE AND IDEOLOGY. EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET VULNERABILITY, IN OTHER WORDS, SHOULD BE CONSCIOUSLY DESIGNED TO BUILD INCENTIVES FOR PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT, BE IT COMPETITIVE, PARALLEL, OR EVEN SELECTIVELY COOPERATIVE.

17. TWO EXAMPLES: THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WORLD OCEAN. TO THIS END, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHALLENGING THE SOVIETS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY IN AREAS WHERE THEY ARE BRIDESMAIDS, BUT NOT YET BRIDES. TWO SUCH AREAS COME IMMEDIATELY TO MIND.

18. IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SOVIET POSITION HAS CHANGED DRASTICALLY SINCE 1973. THE WAR CREATED A SITUATION WHERE THE ARABS AND SOVIETS WERE ON ONE SIDE, ISRAEL AND THE U.S. ON THE OTHER. ALTHOUGH MOSCOW TOOK STEPS TO LIMIT DAMAGE TO ITS "DETENTE" POLICY WITH THE U.S., IT NONETHELESS FOUND THIS POLARIZED SITUATION MUCH TO ITS LIKING. DESPITE THE SOBERING EFFECT OF THE 1973 GLOBAL U.S. MILITARY ALERT, THE SOVIETS HAD EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE GENEVA MEPC MEANT U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ACCEPANCE OF THEIR GREAT POWER STATUS AND THEIR SPECIAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. SINCE THAT TIME, HOWEVER, AN ACTIVE U.S. POLICY -- AND SOVIET MISTAKES -- HAVE REDUCED MOSCOW'S ROLE TO THAT OF A HECKLER IN THE STANDS. THE SOVIETS ARE PINFULLY CONSCIOUS OF THIS SETBACK, AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE GENEVA RESUMED SO AS TO RATIFY THEIR EQUAL STATUS WITH THE U.S. AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT DESPITE THEIR SORT-TERM SETBACK, OVER THE LONG-TERM THE SOVIETS WILL MAINTAIN AT LEAST THE CAPABILITY TO ACT AS A SPOILER.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 10 STATE 030246

19. NOW THAT THE PRESENT LIMITS OF SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH THE ARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS HAVE BEEN SO CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED, THE U.S. CAN MOVE TO GENEVA IN TANDEM WITH MOSCOW, IF THIS IS DEEMED THE BEST OR PERHAPS ONLY FEASIBLE AVENUE TO PROGRESS ON A SETTLEMENT. WE SHOULD DO SO, HOWEVER, ONLY ON MOSCOW'S CLEAR AGREEMENT NOT TO BOX US INTO A CONVERENCE WHERE OHERS SIT AND WAIT FOR THE U.S. TO PRESSURE ISRAEL TO MAKE UNILATERAL CONCESSIONS. ALTHOUGH WE NEED NOT OVERESTIMATE IT, SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH THE ARAB RADICALS EXISTS, AND WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR OUR EXPECTATION THAT IF GENEVA RESUMES, AND WE ARE WILLING IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE TO RISK SOME STRAIN IN OUR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, THEN THE SOVIETS MUST EXERT SOME MEASURABLE LEVERAGE ON THE HARD-LINE LARAB STATES AND THE PALESTINIANS. BREZHNEV'S BRIEF REMARKS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATIONIN HIS JANUARY 18 TULA SPEECH SUGGEST THA THE SOVIETS MAY REALIZE THIS IS THE PRICE THEY WILL HAVE TO PAY TO GET BACK IN THE GAME, VIA GENEVA.

20. IN THE WORLD OCEAN, THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS AND VIGOROUS BUT INCONSISTENT PLAYERS. IN LOS MATTERS, THEY HAVE GENERALLY BEEN SOBER AND CONSTRUCTIVE, ALTHOUGH NOT SO CONSTRUCTIVE AS WE WOULD LIKE. THEWORLD OCEAN IS AN AREA WHERE THE USSR HAS IMPORTANT AND GROWING STAKES, AND WHERE IT CAN BE MADE TO DO BUSINESS IN CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS BACKED BY TOUGH WESTERN ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

21. A STRATEGY CENTERED ON VALUE. THE MIDDLE EAST, THE THIRD WORLD, AND WORLD OCEANS ARE EXAMPLES OF PRIME CANDIDATES FOR A STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT THROUGH CHALLENGE TO THE SOVIETS, BY THE U.S. THE STRATEGY ITSELF, WE BELIEVE, CAN BEST BE FRAMED IN TERMS OF A U.S. POLICY ORIENTED TOWARD VALUE RATHER THAN RELYING SOLELY ON GREAT POWER POLITICS. "VALUE" AS A CRITERION FOR POLICY DOES NOT MEAN SIMPLY A RETURN TO ANTI-COMMUNISM AS THE BEST COMMON DENOMINATOR FOR SOLIDARITY IN AMERICA'S ALLIANCES AND IN CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SUPPORT AT HOME. WE SHOULD CONTINUE TOHIGHLIGHT THE FAILURES, INADEQUACIES AND VICIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. BUT IN DEVELOPING POLICY AND MANAGING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 11 STATE 030246

RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER SUPERPOWER WE SHOULD ALSO REMAIN TRUE TO OURSELVES AND TO THOSE OF LIKE MIND IN THE WORLD. IF IT WORKDS, IT CAN HELP FORCE HOME TO THE SOVIETS THE COSTS OF LETTING THEIR IDEOLOGY DICTATE IRRESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR.

22. TO BE SPECIFIC, SUCH AN APPROACH INVOLVES CNSTANTLY RE-EMPHASIZING FIRST PRIORITY TO OUR RELATIONS WITH LLIES AND

FRIENDS ON THE SOVIET PRIPHERY WITH WHOM WE SHARE VALUES. NO OTHER COURSE IS SO LIKELY TO BUILD REAL INCENTIVES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, SINCE BESIDES THE POTENTIAL SYNERGISTIC EFFECT OF ENHANCED WESTERN UNITY, IT WILL CONFRONT THE USSR WITH A NOVEL SITUATION IN CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP, AT LEAST IN POSTWAR HISTORY: NEITHER KNEE-JERK HOSPILITY NOR FECKLESS OPTIMISM, BUT AN ATTITUDE VARYING FROM COOLNESS TO RECEPTIVITY DEPENDING ON THE ISSUE AND ON SOVIET PERFORMANCE. THE DEMONSTRATION THAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON CONSISTENT COMMITMENT TO PRINCIPLE --SHARED, WE WOULD HOPE, BY OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS, AND EXEMPLIFIED IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THEM-- WILL BE CLAR TO THE SOVIETS AS WELL.

23. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE SHOULD ALSO BE WARY OF THE NATURAL TEMPTATION TO MANIPULATE THE SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THAT WE HAVE A ROLE IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE IS ONE OF THE GIVENS OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICS, AND EACH SIDE TO THE DISPUTE WILL TRY ASSIDUOUSLY TO MOVE US TOWARD ITSELF ON THE SEESAW WHICH SEPARATES THEM. FOR OUR PART, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE SCRUPULOUSLY CORRECT WITH BOTH, IN SEEKING TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH EACH. WHILE WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT EVERY AMERICAN MOVE IN THIS AREA WILL BE SEEN BY BOTH THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THEIR CONFRONTATION, THE GREAT DAYS OF SINO-SOVIET LEVERAGE IN U.S. POLICY MAY BE PRACTICALLY OVER, BARRING AN UNFORESEEN MAJOR DETERIORATION IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. AND IN A POLICY CENTERED ON VALUE THEY SHOULD ALSO BE OVER ON GROUNDS OF PRINCIPLE: OUR VALUES SEPARATE US FROM BOTH THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS, JUST AS THEY TIE US TO THE WEST EUROPEANS AND THE JAPANESE.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 12 STATE 030246

24. NEXT, WE SHOULD MAKE OUR COMMITMENT TO OUR PRINCIPLES EXPLICIT IN THE CONDUCT OF BILATERAL DIPLOMACY WITH THE SOVIETS. TACTICAL DECISIONS ABOUT TIMING AND VENUE, ABOUT "QUIET" VERSUS PUBLIC REAFFIRMATIONS, AND ABOUT EFFECTIVENESS IN RELATION TO OTHER ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, SHOULD BE MADE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. BUT AS A GENERAL RULE, IT WILL BE USEFUL IN TERMS OF BOTH U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT AND USG INTERNAL COHERENCE TO MAKE OUR COMMITMENT PUBLIC WHERE POSSIBLE, AND WE CAN WELL AFFORD TO BE MORE FORTHRIGHT IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS. AND THE U.S.-SOVIET DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES OF 1972 SETS FORTH AN AGREED STANDARD TO WHICH THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE HELD.

25. AS A COROLLARY, WE SHOULD INSIST ON STRICT RECIPROCITY IN OUR BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIETS. PAST PRACTICES OF IGNORING OR OVERLOOKING "MINOR" SOVIET INFRACTIONS OF AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS IN THE HOPE OF ACHIEVING MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS HAVE SUBJECTED US TO THE CONTINUAL NICKEL-AND-DIME AT WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE PAST MASTERS. THE RESULTS HAVE OFTEN LEFT US AT A DISTINCT

DISADVANTAGE, WHICH HAS CONTRIBUTED IN TURN TO DISENCHANTMENT -- PUBLIC, CONGRESSIONAL AND WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH -- TOWARD THE PROSPECTS FOR BROADER NORMALIZATION. THIS DISENCHANTMENT IS AS UNNECESSARY AS THE RECORD OF PETTY AND CASUAL SHARP PRACTICE WHICH PRODUCES IT. BOTH ARE REMEDIABLE, THROUGH FIRM INSISTANCE ON IMMEDIATE AND STRICT RECIPROCITY, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

26. THE TEST OF BELGRADE. BY WAY OF FINAL ILLUSTRATION, IT IS WORTH POINTING OUT THAT MOST OF THE ELEMENTS OF A STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT THROUGH CHALLENGE -- ARMS CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIORITY TO RELATIONS WITH ALLIES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE SUPR-POWER RELATIONSHIP -- WILL COME TOGETHER, IN AN EARLY TEST CASE, AT THE BELGRADE CSCE REVIEW MEETING WHICH BEGINS JUNE 15. SOVIET CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IS A MAJOR ISSUE IN WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION AND IN THE CONGRESS. THE SOVIETS ARE COMMITTED BY A DECADE OF HISTORY TO THE CSCE PROCESS, AND ARE ALREADY SKITTISH ABOUT BELGRADE. THE WESTERN POSTURE IS CLEARLY A MATTER FOR CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 13 STATE 030246

ALLIANCE COORDINATION AND DECISION, AND WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE VIEW THAT BELGRADE, AS ANOTHER STEP IN THE CSCE PROCESS, CAN BE A USEFUL TOOL FOR MANAGING INTRA-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AT THE PRESENT STAGE. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES ARE MATTERS WHICH DESERVE THE SCRUTINY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE FINAL ACT, OF ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS. FINALLY, THE BELGRADE MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE AS SALT APPROACHES ANOTHER CULMINATION POINT, AND THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE THAT THEIR PERFORMANCE AT BELGRADE WILL BE ONE FACTOR DETERMINING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR A NEW SALT AGREEMENT. OUR SIX BILATERAL EXCHANGES ON CSCE WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW, INCLUDING A STRONG AND CONSTRUCTIVE U.S. DEMARCHE ON DECEMBER 14, HAVE PUT THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR APPROACH ON RECORD WITH THE SOVIETS, AND PLACED US IN A GOOD POSITION TO ASSUME A LEADERSHIP ROLE BOTH WITH OUR ALLIES AND WITH THE SOVIETS AT BELGRADE.

27. THE SKILL FACTOR AND THE ROLE OF CONSULTATIONS. THE STRATEGIC GOAL ENVISAGED HERE FOR U.S. -SOVIET POLICY-- TO INDUCE THE USSR TO BECOME A RESPONSIBLE PLAYER IN A GAME WHOSE RULES CAN EMERGE ONLY SLOWLY IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NOW UNDERWAY-- DEMANDS PATIENCE, PROBITY AND ABOVE ALL A HIGH DEGREE OF SKILL, IF IT IS TO BE SUCCESSFULLY PURSUDED. IN A GAME WITHOUT TOTAL VICTORY OR TOTAL DEFEAT, THE MARGIN OF ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE WILL BE SMALL, AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT. TO JUDGE THE MARGIN, TO PUSH IT OUT FURTHER IN THE DIRECTION OF OUR NATIONAL INTEREST, WILL REQUIRE MORE CONTACT, MORE INFORMATION, AND MORE STAYING POWER THAN EVER BEFORE IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.

28. ONE KEY TO THE KIND OF MODEST SUCCESS THE U.S. SHOULD

ASPIRE TO, IT SEEMS TO US, WILL BE MORE FREQUENT AND MORE
DETAILED CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AT MANY LEVELS, AND ON
MOST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. THE PRACTICE OF REGULAR CONSULTATIONS
SHOULD BE AIMED AT THOSE ELEMENTS IN THE SOVIET ESTABLISHMENT
BEST EQUIPPED TO PARTICIPATE: TO GIVE GOOD TWO-WAY INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 14 STATE 030246

AND GOOD TWO-WAY ADVICE. IN SOME CASES WE HAVE ACCESS TO SUCH
ELEMENTS HERE, AND BELIEVE WE COULD EXPAND IT PROFITABLY BY
CONSULTING WITH THEM IN MOSCOW ON AN INSTRUCTED BASIS. BUT
IT ALSO MEANS MORE VISITS TO MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON, IN CONNECTION
WITH SCHEDULED VISITS ELSEWHERE, OF SENIOR WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS
(AT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND MFA DEPUTY MINISTER OR DIVISION
CHIEF LEVEL); IT MEANS EXPANSION OF U.S. - SOVIET WORKING-LEVEL
INTERACTION AT MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SITES -- GENEVA,
VIENNA, LONDON; AND IT MEANS SYSTEMATIC U.S.- SOVIET CONSULTATIONS
AT UN HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK.

29. IN SEVERAL AREAS, FIRMLY REGULAR EXCHANGES HAVE TAKEN
PLACE, AND HAVE ALMOST ALWAYS BEEN CONSIDERED BENEFICIAL BY
BOTH SIDES. BUT WE STILL LACK THE MECHANISM FOR DIRECT BILATERAL
POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH SEVERAL OF OUR ALLIES HAVE. WE SHOULD
NOT EXAGGERATE THE UTILITY OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS FOR SOLVING MAJOR
PROBLEMS, BUT WE CAN AND SHOULD BE LOOKING FOR WAYS TO ENGAGE THE
SOVIETS MORE FULLY IN ROUTINE TALKS. ROUTINIZATION SHOULD ALLAY
THE CONCERNS WHICH U.S.- SOVIET CONSULTATIONS HAVE PROVOKED, AMONG
ALLIES AND FRIENDS, IN THE PAST; IT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY PROMOTE
THE GOAL OF NORMALIZING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FOR THE
FUTURE.

30. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED.

TOON UNQUOTE VANCE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: FOREIGN RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 10-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE030246
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA/PRCM:RRHART
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770047-1046
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770253/aaaabvgf.tel
Line Count: 585
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: f44874c8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3352530
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: U.S. SOVIET POLICY UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION: II. THE STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
TAGS: PFOR, UR, US
To: PEKING
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/f44874c8-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009